THE STORY OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES 


A Condensed Chapter from 

LAW MAKING IN AMERICA 

\/ by Lynn Haines 
n 

With an Introduction by 
HON. GEORGE W. NORRIS 
Congressman from Nebraska 




And an Article on 

THE DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATION 
By Gifford Pinchot 


“Cannonism is gone. In its place the House has shifted 
to another system, just as vicious and equally un¬ 
fruitful. The new methods are those of Aldrichism 
during the best days of the oligarchy in the Senate ” 








Copyright 1912 

LYNN HAINES 

Bethesda, Maryland 


AN INTRODUCTION 

By Hon. George W, Norris of Nebraska. 

It is always a difficult task to describe a parliamentary situation in 
language that can be easily understood by people who are not parlia¬ 
mentarians. Mr. Haines has succeeded in doing this remarkably well, 
and to a remarkable degree. He has not only shorn the subject of its 
parliamentary technicalities and given us an unobstructed view, of 
Congress at work, but he has told us the truth about it. 

7 The^chief evil of demo crati c management in the House has been 
caucus co ntrol. By this ineans the'Tr'eedom of individual action has 
been abrdTutely nullified and legislative control by the political machine 
has been firmly established. The caucus is in reality a method by which 
a majority is controlled by a minority. The present House of Repre¬ 
sentatives has 393 members. Of this number 229 are democrats. In a 
caucus of democratic members 115 would be able to control the caucus 
and by this means the entire membership of 393. But this is assuming 
that all the democrats attend the caucus, something that never happens. 
As a matter of fact nearly every caucus held during the last two years 
has been controlled by less than 115 men. 

Let us see what the minimum of control could be under the present 
system. A majority of the democratic membership would constitute 
a quorum, and make a legal caucus. This majority of the present 
democratic membership is 115. This number when assembled pursuant 
to a call could take action, by a majority of those present, that 
would be binding on all democrats, and through them would control 
the House. A majority of this quorum would be 58, and we thus 
have the remarkable and unnatural condition of 58 men in secret caucus 
controlling the official action of 393 members of the House. 

It must be remembered also that the caucus is not recognized either 
by the constitution or by any statute. It is an unofficial organization, 
and yet it controls with an iron hand the official organization. Men 
are elected to the House and take an oath of office to perform their 
official duties according to their own ideas of right and wrong, and 
yet they permit their official votes to be determined by an unofficial 
organization meeting in secret and often controlled by secret influences. 
It is through the caucus that the political boss and the political ma¬ 
chine maintain their control. 

The difference between the progressive republicans and the pro¬ 
gressive democrats is that the republican progressives recognize as 
fundamental, opposition to caucus rule and to machine control. They 
will pay allegiance to no political boss, and believe in individual re¬ 
sponsibility rather than caucus responsibility. The democratic pro¬ 
gressives have not yet reached the point where they are ready to de¬ 
clare their own freedom against caucus rule. 

Caucus control was well illustrated in the special session of the 
present Congress. At the beginning of that session the democratic 








4 


caucus decided that no bills should be reported to the House from any 
of the standing committees except such as were designated by the 
caucus. The standing committees were all appointed and organized 
with a full quota of clerkships and assistants; hundreds of bills were 
introduced and referred to the House committees, many of them on 
important subjects in which the country was deeply interested; the 
members of the House were all present and many of them anxious to 
perform the work for which they had been elected. Notwithstanding 
all this, however, no bills were reported to the House or placed on the 
Calendar except those that had received the sanction of the democratic 
caucus. 

There were many instances where the entire membership of a com¬ 
mittee, both republican and democratic, were in favor of the legis¬ 
lation pending before them, but because the democratic caucus had 
decreed that no such legislation should be reported during that session, 
the democratic majority of the committee refused to permit any report 
to be made. An unofficial body, operating in secret, was thus con¬ 
trolling the action of an official body recognized by law. Members of 
the House of Representatives on standing committees refused to per¬ 
form the functions for which they had been elected and which they 
had taken an oath to perform because a caucus, held in secret and 
controlled by the political machine, had decreed that they should not 
act. 

This is a species of parliamentary slavery, and is absolutely incon¬ 
sistent with free representative government. 

The members of the House of Representatives, coming directly from 
the people, should be absolutely free to follow the dictates of con¬ 
science in every official action. There should be no caucus control on 
matters of legislation. There can be no real freedom as long as the 
people’s representatives, with gagged lips and shackled hands, con¬ 
tinue to worship at the shrine of King Caucus. 


Cannonism is gone. In its 
place the House has shifted to 
another system, just as vicious 
and equally unfruitful. The 
new methods are those of Al- 
drichism during the best days 
of the oligarchy in the Senate. 


THE STORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES 

A condensed chapter from 

LA W MAKING IN AMERICA 
By Lynn Haines. 

It takes time for one to get an adequate view of big events, or even 
to distinguish that events are big. When Reed and McKinley clashed 
for the Speakership of the House of Representatives, in 1889, we saw 

little in that contest save a rivalry for 
advancement between two public 
men. Yet, had McKinley won, sub¬ 
sequent political history might have 
been quite different. But Reed was 
the victor, and there began the 
growth of those congressional con¬ 
ditions which form the background 
of my story. 

In the beginning" of Reed’s reign as Speaker, the House was char¬ 
acterized by more of mobbishness than ever before or since. Mem¬ 
bers were ungoverned and ungovernable. Students of that parlia¬ 
mentary period will remember the “no quorum” difficulties that so 
often completely obstructed the public business; and that under cer¬ 
tain privileged motions a half dozen men could filibuster for hours, 
days or weeks, whenever the spirit moved them. 

In this crisis came Reed and the Reed rules. The situation seemed 
to justify an extreme remedy, and that was the kind provided. Reed 
ruled over the refractious few with an iron hand. He enlarged the 
powers of the Speakership. He broke ground and sowed seeds which 
later ripened into Cannonism. 

McKinley was of a different type. Naturally not a dictator, he 
never could have performed the miracle of personal power that Reed 
accomplished. Had McKinley become Speaker, the crisis of that 
hour must have turned in another direction. There might not have 
been an advance toward orderly and true deliberation, but it does 
seem certain that Cannonism would not have developed subsequently 
as it did. But McKinley did not become Speaker; Reed was suc¬ 
cessful, and he made the speakership the second most powerful and 
important office in the United States. Under Cannon the nation 
reaped the whirlwind. 

Cannonism did two big things: first, it held in check, for years, the 
progressive movement in the House; and, second, it aroused in the 
American people such blind and unreasoning resentment that they 
grew to consider “Uncle Joe” the only evil in law making. There 
was a general demand that Cannonism be abolished, but apparently no 



6 


thought was given to the legislative system which was to take its 
place. The assumption seemed to be that with Cannonism gone the 
problem of legislation would be solved. 

Now Cannonism is gone—completely gone. Let us see what has 
replaced it. When that step has been taken, understandingly, it will 
be a simple matter to comprehend what this session did or failed to 
accomplish. 


♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 

The country is fairly familiar with that condition in law making 
known as Cannonism. Under that system legislation depended wholly 
upon the Speaker. Each day’s work was programmed in 
Cannonism advance, and no deviation was permitted. ^ No member 
could gain recognition without first obtaining a private 
interview with the Speaker, and arranging in advance for the special 
privilege of the floor. His prayer for recognition had always to be 
accompanied with an explanation of the purpose for which he desired 
to make a motion or a speech. As we look back upon it now, the 
Cannon method seems too savagely sultanic to be recent and real. 

Cannonism can be summed up very briefly. The Speaker, as a 
member and the dominator of the Committee on Rules, made the rules 
which gave him absolute and arbitrary power over all the activities 
of the House. He compelled complete obedience to his rules through 
committee assignments. 

Here is an important point to keep in mind as we proceed with the 
development of the new order in the House. Under Cannon, the 
secret caucus and such agencies as the Rules Committee and other 
standing committees, existed and possessed vast powers, but were 
rarely used to retard legislation. The Speaker was supreme and suf¬ 
ficient in himself for all ordinary purposes of obstruction. But when 
the system shifted, as will be shown in detail, the special interest- 
professional politician obstructionists called into service their second¬ 
ary lines of defenses—special rules, the caucus and stand'ng committees. 

***** 


When Cannonism was enjoying its best days in the House, an en¬ 
tirely different system flourished in the Senate. That was known as 
Aldrichism. ^ In that machine the presiding officer 
Apdrichism counted for little, excepting to execute orders. And in 
no other vital respect did the Senate system resemble 
Cannonism. The Senate organized itself, theoretically, through a 
“committee on committees.” Back of everything was the secret ma¬ 
jority party caucus. The floor leader was the big personal power. 

Under Cannonism, Cannon, the presiding officer, organized and 
dominated the House. Under Aldrichism, Aldrich, the floor leader, 
named the committees and dominated the Senate. Under the Cannon 
system, the Speaker was supreme, the floor leader a figurehead. Under 
the Aldrich system, the floor leader was supreme, the presiding officer 
a figurehead. 

The big fact in both systems was control by a few. 


7 


The progressives in Congress who fought both Cannonism and 
Aldrichism evolved a third legislative system, one never put into 
practice because that element was always a mi- 
The Way of the nority. This new system was simple, direct, ade- 
Progressives quate. It was based upon the principle that the 

normal purpose of rules should be to advance 
legislation. Its other foundation tenets were: (1) full light of day upon 
all the acts of Congress and of every subsidiary body; and (2) the fix¬ 
ing of responsibility for all that Congress did or did not do, not upon 
the Speaker, or a caucus, or a party, or standing committees, but 
directly upon a majority of all the members of Congress. 

The progressives demanded that there be an end of caucus “legis¬ 
lation,” that the caucus be converted into a conference, leaving all 
the details of legislation to be worked out in the open by the House 
as a whole. 

The progressives sought to compel standing committees to keep a 
complete public record of all their acts, and to be subject to the 
authority of a majority of the House at any time. 

These three legislative systems—Cannonism, Aldrichism, and the 
fundamental reforms in law making methods contended for by the’ 
progressive group—were definitely_ before the democratic majority 
when the present Hous.e was organized. 

***** 

Perhaps comparatively not many of the millions of voters under¬ 
stood their own aspirations in this respect, but emancipation of the 
majority was the chief issue in the congressional 
UndErwoodism elections of 1910. The people struck, blindly, at Can¬ 
nonism. Not knowing exactly what it meant or how 
it would work, they wanted the House to organize itself. They wanted 
the Speaker dethroned from the Rules Committee. They demanded a 
complete change of system in the House. Accordingly the democratic 
minority in the Sixty-first Congress grew to the democratic majority 
of 65 in the Sixty-second. Clark was chosen Speaker and the system 
did change, as radically as the most radical could desire. Let us 
examine into the new House situation, first comparatively and then 
as a separate system: 

UNDER CANNON UNDER UNDERWOOD 


The speaker was supreme and 
omnipotent. 

The majority party caucus was 
rarely used or needed. 

The Rules Committee, domi¬ 
nated absolutely and arbitrarily by 
the Speaker, made the rules, and 
was a law unto itself. 


The Speaker, excepting in one 
comparatively unimportant par¬ 
ticular, is shorn of power. 

The majority party caucus has 
become the dominating element. 

The Rules Committee, domi¬ 
nated by the floor leader and the 
caucus, makes the rules and retains 
all its old powers. Its reports are 
privileged, its acts or omissions 
subject to no higher authority. 
It is a steering committee and can 
control the fate of all legislation. 


8 


Standing committees were ap¬ 
pointed by the Speaker. 


Standing committees were 
wholly free from control by a ma¬ 
jority of the House, unless the 
Speaker interposed his arbitrary 
power in behalf of the majority. 

Standing committees kept no 
public record of their acts. 

The floor leader was a figure¬ 
head. 


Standing committees are ap¬ 
pointed by the Ways and Means 
Committee of which the floor 
leader is chairman. 

Standing committees are today 
even farther removed from con¬ 
trol by the majority than when 
Cannon was deposed as speaker. 

Standing committees still act in 
secret. 

The floor leader is supreme. 


* * * * 


Following the congressional elections of November, 1910, which 
gave the democrats full control of the House, the members of that 

party caucussed at the capital. This was 
The; Democratic Caucus on January 19, 1911. In that caucus the 

new system took definite shape. It was 

then determined that— 

Clark should be Speaker; 

Underwood should be floor leader; 

Underwood should be chairman of the Ways and Means Com¬ 
mittee; 

The democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee 
should organize the House by naming its committees; 

The selection of republican committee members should be left to 
the determination of a majority of the minority party; 

The democratic caucus should not be open; and 

The caucus should determine the attitude and legislative action 
of the democratic majority; in other words, control the whole House. 

Since the secret caucus is not only the cornerstone, but the entire 
foundation, of the new order in the House, its principles and practices 
should be clearly understood. Shorn of all pretence, the caucus is a 
cowardly contrivance to manacle the majority and enable a minority 
to control. Every member who participates in a caucus is bound to 
abide by the decisions of that caucus, and to carry out its decrees. 
Take away from a caucus that cardinal tenet and it is no longer a 
caucus. Without the power to bind its members to unanimity, a 
caucus becomes only a conference. Obviously, then, a majority of 
the caucus controls its own minority, and, when it is a caucus of the' 
predominant party, a majority of the caucus controls also the whole 
membership of the House. 


9 


Certain figures should be before us. The present House of Repre¬ 
sentatives has 393 members. Of these 229 are democrats, giving that 
party a majority of 65. All democrats are members of the caucus. 
One hundred and fifteen constitutes a majority of the caucus. It 
requires no special astuteness, either mathematically or politically, to 
reach the only possible conclusions: 

A bare majority, 115 members, ^of the caucus can bind, gag and 
deliver, not only its own minority, but the House itself; 

One hundred and fifteen are more powerful than the other 278 
members of the House; 

A majority of the democratic caucus controls all legislation. 

Actually, less than a majority of the caucus controls. It is very 
seldom that more than three-fourths of its membership attend the 
caucus; often the number is less. But custom decrees that a majority 
of those voting be considered binding and that, rather than the literal 
rule, has been observed. In the caucus vote to decide whether the 
money trust should be investigated by a partial or an impartial com¬ 
mittee, 115 voted with Underwood, and that vote bound all the caucus, 
and determined the action of the whole House. 

The history of this money trust resolution illustrates well both 
the operation and application of caucus principles. Congress¬ 
man Lindbergh introduced a resolution providing for a special 
committee empowered to make a full investigation into banking and 
currency conditions. Judged by the immediate activity against it of 
Wall Street’s representatives in Congress, this resolution was the 
most important matter brought before the present session. It was 
referred to the Rules Committee, a subsidiary body over which the 
rules give the House no authority. If six of the ten members of the 
Rules Committee refuse to report to the House, the other 387 mem¬ 
bers of the House are powerless to compel action. 

The issue raised by the Lindbergh resolution might have remained 
buried in the Rules Committee, as the resolution itself and other vital 
questions have been smothered in that body, but public sentiment made 
that course unsafe. Accordingly, a substitute resolution was pre¬ 
sented, not to the House of Representatives, but to the caucus. What 
followed in that case exposes a number of principal and collateral evils 
of the caucus system. 

The democrats were divided. One hundred and fifteen voted with 
Underwood, Fitzgerald and Clark, who might be called the caucus 
cabinet, to have the investigation made by the Committee on Banking. 
Sixty-six voted with Henry and the progressive democrats in favor 
of conducting the investigation through a special committee not com¬ 
posed chiefly of bankers or bankers’ attorneys. The 66, being out¬ 
voted in the caucus, became completely enslaved and submerged in the 
115. When the question later came before the House their votes were 
joined with those of the caucus majority. 

That takes us another step. The 115, by controlling the caucus, at 
first with only their own votes, nullified in advance any different action 
that the other 278 members might have taken on the floor of the 


10 


House. But this control of the whole House by a majority of a 
caucus, or, more truthfully, by a majority of those voting at a caucus, 
falls far short of expressing the inequities of the system. 

There were three money trust resolutions. First, the one by Mr. 
Lindbergh, which was sent to .the Rules Committee and is still in¬ 
terred there. Second, one offered by Mr. Henry, modifying the Lind¬ 
bergh resolution and introduced for the further purpose of taking the 
matter out of the hands of a republican and giving the caucus juris¬ 
diction. And third, the substitute proposed by Mr. Pujo, which the 
caucus approved. 

After the caucus had acted, binding all its members, hand, foot and 
mouth, the next proceeding was to gag the republican minority. The 

/ Rules Committee, in a privileged report, brought* the Pujo resolution 
into the House, limited debate and shut off amendments. Cannonism 
; never conceived and carried out anything more und eliber ative, morejm-. 
repres elTraTl ve than that^ Members had absolutely no opportunity to 

I do other Hian vote foFor against the Pujo resolution. The Lindbergh 
resolution was buried, away from the House. Probably more than half 
of the House would have preferred to vote on that, or to propose 
some change, but— , 

Th e c aucus not only decided the issue in advance, hut also the exact 
fo?M^in which it should he voted upon In the House. 

It was the same with practically every other important question that 
came before both the special and regular sessions of this congress. A 
majority of those voting in the democratic'caucus, an unofficial body, 
not under oath, and acting behind closed and bolted doors, usurped 
and exercised the legislative functions of the House itself. Let me 
quote the opinions of some of the anti-caucus progressives, congress¬ 
men who have succeeded in discrediting and demolishing the caucus 
in the republican party at this session: 

I Charles A. Lindbergh —“By this caucus system about half the Members resolve 
I themselves mto a body, and by a bare majority tie up the rest and make them 
I vote xn the House as they could not in the caucus, and thereby destroy their entire 
I influence in the House and make the membership generally ineffective in this 
I House. The'tail wags the dog, figuratively, speaking, 

“The members of a caucus are not as such under oath; as such they have no 
connection with the people; they are a self-constituted body, usurping the rights 
01 the House, 

“No member has any influence on the floor of the House after the caucus has 
once made its decision. No act, speech, or deliberation in the House now changes 
the result of caucus action. * 

“The House has capitulated to an unofficial body at the present time known as 
the Democratic caucus. 


defended by some good men. 
Tr^diocrity and cowardice, shrinking from duty, to go 

r; ^ ^ wanted at all, nor what I thought 

right, but the caucus told me to vote for it and I obeyed.’ ’’ inougni; 

Let US illustrate, specifically, the caucus conditions to which these 
quotations refer. As an example, the Canadian reciprocity bill was 
lirst taken up in the democratic caucus; it was debated in that secret 
unofficial body; amendments were considered. Then, a majority of 
those present at that caucus, on April 11, 1911, having agreed upon the 


11 


bill in final form, undeniably a function only of the whole House act¬ 
ing in the open, bound all the members of the caucus, excepting a few 
who were then excused, to vote for the bill “without amendment or 
motion to recommit.” That was as plainly a usurpation of the delib¬ 
erative law making functions of the House of Representatives as could 
be conceived. 

Almost every question at all vital to the interests of the people was 
decided in this secret, unofficial, undeliberative, unrepresentative way. 
The majority party caucus organized the House, dictated such changes 
as were made in its rules, and not only robbed the House of the legiti¬ 
mate fruits of deliberation, but also, excepting in a few cases, of the 
opportunity to deliberate. 

Bills and resolutions were debated and amended in secret caucus 
and then some such resolution as the following, adopted on the motion 
of Mr. Underwood in the case of the chemical bill,— 

“RESOLVED, That the bill adopted by the caucus revising Schedule H 
(the chemical schedule) is hereby declared to be a party measure and the 
members of the caucus bind themselves to vote for the bill without amend¬ 
ment or motion to recommit”— 


made any later attempt at deliberation by the whole House a hollow 
mockery. 

Under the Underwood system , which has take n the place of Can- 
n o n ism, the majo rity part y caucus,— ' ' ” 

Having no official responsibility to the people; 

Dominated by a coterie of re actionarie s; 

Acting in secret sessions,— 

and not the House, determines the details and final results of all legis¬ 
lation. 

■“"TTo one can or will atterr.pt to deny that, through this perverted 
caucus system, less than a hun dre d members dominate the House with 
a maj ority of nearly Tour”Jhundred. Where does''TIhs’"aTT powerful 
minority come fromrand whaf^o'tTiey represent? 

The strictly southern states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Okla¬ 
homa, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and Virginia, 
have a membership in the democratic caucus of 112, enough, to con¬ 
trol in ninety-nTlTC~cases of every"~TTunaTed. Add the 16~Tammany- 
nia^ine made 'democratic representatives from Greater New York and 
it gives 128, thirteen more than a maj ority of the c aucu s. 

The reactiojigryism of the Sgudfi is explainable, but there is no excuse, 
no justification, for the fact that control ^ Congress is absolutely in 
the keeping of a jnere mino rity of representatives. 

I do not mean to infer that all Representatives from the South are 
reactionary. There are a number of well equipped, independent, pro¬ 
gressives from that section, men of the type of Roddenberry, Sisson, 
Harrison, and others; but those exceptions do not alter the situation. 
For every southern progressive there can be foun'd five democratic 
reactionaries from the northern states. 

In full and recent view of both Cannonism and Aldrichism, people 
well may marvel that the progressive democrats permitted their own 









12 


stultification by participation in a caucus which compelled them always 
to vote with the reactionaries of their party. The argument used to 
bring about this result was neither subtle nor sufficient, yet it welded 
the majority into a compact body. It was; “ We de mocrats must 
presen t a united ^ont on eve ryth ing; a democratic admTnistration^ is 
almost within our’^rasp; offiT^nfomplete h armony in our ranks can give 
us control of the government”—which means the offices. As extreme 
privation has driven many a person into the penitentiary, so in this case 
did political hunger lead to cauc us incarceratio n. Once in there was 
no escape, even on probation, —*■ 

It is noteworthy, too, that the caucus chains are galling to many; 
that there are signs of insurrection and mutiny. The persistent and 
determined independence of certain progressives has made it im¬ 
possible ever to again assemble the 'SHTepuBTican machine on a caucus 
basis. 


5|t * * >i« * 

It has been demonstrated that the base of the new House machine 
is the caucus, an essentially corrupting and subversive contrivance 
which gives control of the entire member- 

The Floor LkadEr ship. The chief exponent of this caucus, under 
the present system, is the floor leader. The floor 
leader is also the chief figure in the caucus. Backed by his own power 
over committee appointments, reinforced, when necessary, by two 
other potent forces—the Speaker, with the prestige of his position, and 
the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, with his hands upon 
the purse strings—the floor leader dominates the caucus. The system 
starts and stops at the same point, only the circumvention serves to 
diffuse the responsibility for results in vague, impersonal places, which 
is very unlike the old order in- which the Speaker openly braved the 
blame for all that the House did or did not do, 

Underwood and Clark were rival candidates for Speaker of the 
present House of Representatives. Clark was given the speakership— 
with some of the prestige, but little of the power, that formerly char¬ 
acterized that position. Underwood, on Clark’s motion, became chair¬ 
man of the Ways and Means Committee, which carried with it, at 
least indirectly, the power to select the committees, influence the rules, 
dominate the caucus, and be floor leader—the predominant personal 
power. The stronger man won. Clark was given the shadow; Under¬ 
wood kept the substance. The Speaker became a figurehead, the 
floor leader supreme, which was the Aldrich system. 

The caucus would have presented a sorry spectacle without special 
rules through which to carry out its decrees and legalize its secret acts 
in the House. The House could not have been robbed of its delibera¬ 
tive functions without these “gag” rules, which were of two kinds: 
(1) those engineered directly by the floor leader; and (2) those re¬ 
ported from the Rules Committee. Both had to come from sources 
that were “privileged.” 

By virtue of his office as chairman of the Ways and Means Com¬ 
mittee, the floor leader was a privileged character; that is, he could ask 
recognition at almost any time either to make a motion to restrict 
debate,^ or shut off amendments, or both. A part of Rule 56, on this 
point, is as follows: 



13 


56. The following-named committees shall have leave to report at any time on 
the matters herein stated, viz: The Committee on Rules, on rules, joint rules, and 
order of business; . . , the Committee on Ways and Means, on bills raising 
revenues. 

Thus, whenever the caucus had “legislated” on any tariff question 
and was ready for the farcical performance of bringing the matter 
before the House to secure its foreordained approval, the chairman 
)f the Ways and Means Committee could get recognition whenever he 
pleased to improvise what amounted to a special rule to prescribe how 
the House should act upon the measure. 

Clothed with this perpetual privilege of recognition, and backed by 
his caucus, the floor leader had it in his power to make a Punch and 
Judy show of the House at any time. 

A little history in connection with H. R. 31,213, revising the sugar 
schedule, illustrates the system. This bill was introduced into the 
caucus March 1 and acted upon by that body in the usual way. Then 
followed the superfluous formalities, made necessary only because 
caucus “legislation” is not legal. After the caucus had approved the 
measure and bound its members to stand by the program through to 
its final passage, Mr. Underwood introduced the bill into the House 
the following day, March 3. To comply with another formality, it was 
referred to the Ways and Means Committee, from which it was re¬ 
ported back to the House March 5. Eight days later, Mr. Underwood 
called it up and, after permitting a day of debate, with a number 
begging for the privilege of being heard, he made the following 
motion : 

“I move that all general debate on this bill close in 10 minutes, and on that mo¬ 
tion I move the previous question.” 

The previous question itself was not debatable and when carried, as 
it was by a vote of 163 to 131, only Broussard, Dupre, Estopinal, Gray, 
Martin of Colorado, Ransdell, Rucker of Colorado, Taylor of Colo¬ 
rado, Watkins and Wickliffe of the democratic causus voting against 
the gag, it shut off debate on the Underwood motion. Then the motion 
to close the debate in 10 minutes carried, 157 to 124. 

What are some of the other powers and privileges of the floor leader 
under the new Underwood-Aldrich system? 

Cannon’s control of the House and Aldrich’s control of the Senate 
was based in each case upon control of the committees. The special 
privilege of making committee appointments carried with it then, as it 
does to-day, a kind of vested right in the committees, especially the 
chairmen of committees. 

Good committee chairmanships have a direct money value to mem¬ 
bers. They bring additional office conveniences and more clerical as¬ 
sistance. Each House member is legally allowed $1,500 a year for 
secretarial service. When the chairman of a committee, there is at his 
command also at least one committee clerk. In many cases members 
who are not workers would find it possible, if given good chairman¬ 
ships, to get along with only the committee clerks, thus saving the 
annual allowance of $1,500. Committee chairmanships, therefore, 
represent a subtle, indirect, form of bribe; and the power to appoint 


14 


committees, regardless of whether there is or is not that intention, 
carries with it the subserviency of those beneficiaries who are sordid 
and selfish. 

A majority of members are far beyond the influence of such con¬ 
siderations; but they are few. indeed who can rise above the feeling 
that there is an obligation resting upon them to “return the favor” 
after being given commanding committee positions. Prominence in 
committees is the goal of all members; the system makes it so. And 
when the system is such that congressmen owe their advancement in 
this direction practically to one man, or at least to an oligarchy of the 
House, it is not at all strange that they should feel constrained either 
(1) to pay for the preferment in active work, or (2) be bound to 
silent service with the machine. 

The democratic caucus, in the beginning, gave into the hands of 
Underwood the chief part in the appointment of committees. At the 
preliminary caucus, on January 19, 1911, months before the Sixty- 
second Congress convened, the democratic members of the Ways and 
Means Committee were delegated to organize the House of Repre¬ 
sentatives, and Oscar W. Underwood was then chosen chairman of 
that all-powerful committee. Thus there was added to the constitu¬ 
tionally imposed powers of the majority part of the Committee on 
Ways and Means the functions of a “committee on committees,” such 
as Aldrich used in the Senate when the old oligarchy was supreme. 
There was this difference, however: The organization of the present 
House was virtually done between January 19, 1911, and April 4, 
1911, when the House was not in session. 

sK * * sH ♦ 

The majority members of the Ways and Means Committee are di¬ 
rectly responsible for the placing of democrats upon the standing 
committees; and indirectly, but no less actually, are 
How THE House they accountable for committee assignments on the 
Was Organized republican side. 

In previous sessions, when m the minority and 
powerless to do more than protest, the democrats as a whole pro¬ 
claimed themselves the progressive party; they asserted their sym¬ 
pathy with the progressive republican group that had borne the burden 
of the fight for freedom in the House. When given the opportunity 
and the power to place progressive republicans in committee positions 
where they could best advance the principles for which they stood, 
the democratic majority surrendered them to the mercy of the Cannon 
element in their own party. It would be impossible to over-emphasize 
this proof of the political duplicity of the Southern democrats who 
organized the House and controlled its activities. 

Instead of working with and through republican progressives, the 
democrats (1) not only did not give them influential committee places, 
but (2) so assigned them that their best energies had to be given to 
petty details. 

An analysis of the results appears to prove that it was the deliberate 
intention to place those progressives best equipped and inclined to 


15 


work hardest for the people in positions where relatively unimportant 
matters would take practically all their time. A few examples will 
suffice: 

Sydney Anderson was given places on the committees on Elections, 
and Pensions, where election contests and the details of pension legis¬ 
lation made necessary months of slavish devotion to details. Had not 
Anderson been an incessant worker, he could not have found any time 
for important legislation. 

Henry A. Cooper and John M. Nelson were others who were 
buried in elections committee details. 

Charles A. Lindbergh, one of the oldest and best equipped men in 
Congress, was given places only on Coinage, Weights and Measures, 
and Claims, the latter having to do with a multiplicity of time-taking 
details. 

E. A. Morse had to rise above Insular Affairs, and War Claims. 

Stanton Warburton had Indian Affairs, and Expenditures in the 
War Department. 

William Kent, preeminently qualified for a bigger field, was given 
only Reform in the Civil Service, and Industrial Arts and Expositions. 

There is no attempt here to do more than indicate the general policy, 
or at least, the general result, that prevailed in the committee placing 
of republican progressives. 

The story of how the republican progressive s were betrayed into the 
hands'^ the reactionaries ot their party is interesting and significant. 
At a meeting of the democratic caucus, April 1, 1911, Finly H. Gray, 
the only consistent anti-caucus insurgent among the democrats, offered 
this resolution: 

“Be it Resolved, by the Democratic Members of the House of Representatives, 
That the insurgent republican members of said House, acting as a body, be recog¬ 
nized as a separate and independent minority party organization, and accorded 
the right to select from among themselves representation on the committees of the 
House in such proportion as their number bears to the whole membership of the 
House.” 

This Gray resolution did not even come to a .vote; it was ruled out 
of order in the caucus. That institution then decided that the republi¬ 
cans, acting as a party, should select the minority committee members, 
subject to the approval of the democratic majority of the Ways and 
Means Committee. 

Whereupon the republican regulars held a caucus, the first and only 
one during the two sessions of this Congress. Most of the progressives 
did not attend, and so strong has that element now become that it is 
very improbable that another republican caucus will ever be attempted. 
The reactionaries were in absolute control of this caucus and they 
delegated James R. Mann, a Cannon lieutenant, to name the republican 
members of committees. To that end was the Gray resolution ruled 
out of order in the democratic caucus. 

The new House method of organization was thus established. It was 
unlike the Cannon way, in which the Speaker alone selected the com¬ 
mittees. Essentially it was the Aldrich system. Underwood, backed 
by the democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee, as¬ 
signed the democrats. Mann, supervised by Underwood and his part of 




16 


the Ways and Means Committee, gave the republicans^ their com¬ 
mittee stations. The progressives of both parties were “between the 
devil and the deep sea.” 

The three crucial committees, under the new House system, are 
(1) Ways and Means; (2) Rules; and (3) Appropriations. These 
committees, because of their special powers, dominate in every direc- 
tion. ... 

As the House is now organised there u only a single anti-caucns 
progressive on the three all-powerful committees. Tcnroot has a place 
on the Rules Committee. That tells the story of the democratic 
attitude toward republican progressives. 

The republican minority members placed upon the Ways and Means 
Committee by the Mann-Underwood combination were: Sereno E. 
Payne of New York, John Dalzell of Pennsylvania, Samuel W. 
• MTCall of Massachusetts, E.“ B. 1^1 of Connecticut, James C. Need- 
ham of California, Jos. W. Eprd hey of Michigan, and Nicholas Long- 
w^th of Ohio, each a leading reaHionary from his State. All repre¬ 
sented flTediigh protectionist view the ta riff . 

Only one facE^^e crucial fact—need be noted in connection with 
the controlling democratic part of these^ three dominant committees. 
Nineteen of the total thirty-five democratic places were filled by mem¬ 
bers from Southern states. Ten of the remaining sixteen places were 
given to the East, leaving the more actively progressive sections of the 
country practically unrepresented. 

***** 

p Thus far we have found nothing in the new House system that^ is 
not almost identical, feature for feature, with the old Aldrich machine 
in~the Senate. The se cret caucu s was the basjs of 
Control of AldfiHiism, as it is of Underwoodrsm. AldricTT was the 
Committees indisputaBTe master of the Senate, as Underwood is 
master in the House. Backed by an oligarchy of re¬ 
actionaries, Aldrich organized the Senate, just as Underwood has 
organized the House. Each became floor leader, the dominating per¬ 
sonal power. But we come now to a distinctive difference : The Senate 
n ever completely surre ndere d its deliberative functions, its control of 
committees; the House7 in addition to caucus chains and floor leader 
domination, ushered in a n ew era of committee supremacy and special 
rules on a scale which has^no~precedent in aTr~cohgressional history 
and no justification from any possible point of view. 

Under‘CannofT'and the Cannon rules, standing committees (1) acted 
in secret, and (2) were almost wholly free from the authority of the 
House. The progressives’ fight against Cannonism, before the be¬ 
ginning of the present congress, resulted in a substantial correcting of 
the second evil. In this session, the House retreated to the old re¬ 
actionary order and under the present rules— 

There is no way by which a majority of the House can compel re¬ 
luctant committees to report business to the House. • 

Standing committees, still acting in secret and with no public record 
of their proceedings, are supremely in control of legislation. 





17 


As a remedy for this indefensible condition as it existed under 
Cannon there was provided during the Sixty-first Congress, a Calendar 
of Motions to Discharge Committees and an opportunity to use this 
means of meeting the evil. In the early part of the present session 
this calendar rapidly filled with motions. Progressives filed them in 
order to advance good legislation; reactionary republicans filed motions 
to discharge committees and bring certain measures to an open vote 
in the House because they were playing politics and desired to em¬ 
barrass the democratic majority. 

Led by Underwood and Henry the democrats, caucus bound, took 
away from the House the power and the opportunity to exercise con¬ 
trol of its standing committees. They did not take this backward step 
openly; the change was shifty and masked against criticism. 

On February 3, 1912, the Rules Committee, representing the demo¬ 
cratic majority, reported an amendment to the rules, which placed the 
Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees after “suspension of the 
rules” and the “unanimous consent” calendar. By giving these com¬ 
paratively unimportant matters precedence on the only day of the week 
when the question of discharging committees could be in order, it was 
made possible, through filibuster and manipulation, to prevent any and 
all action under the crucial part of the rule. The change also restored 
certain arbitrary powers of recognition to the Speaker. 

In the fight on this amendment, the right of the minority to offer 
any amendment was denied in the usual way. Then the new rule was 
adopted by a vote of 153 to 102. Only Gray of Indiana and Hamilton 
of West Virginia, of the democrats, voted negatively. 

The following quotation is from the Congressional Record: 

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. Speaker, if we pass this rule which is now proposed, it 
would have the same effect as though you wrote across the rule now in the book 
the following words; “This rule shall have no effect and be of no validity except 
in cases where the Speaker wants it to be.” You clearly place it within the power 
of the Speaker to completely nullify the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Com¬ 
mittees, just as much as though it were not written in the rules of this House. 
The Speaker has supreme power of recognition in motions to suspend the rules. 
He may recognize or not recognize. He has that power now, if we can reach it. 
The way this rule will be nullified, if the Speaker wants to nullify it, will be for 
him to recognize some, friend on that day to move to suspend the rules. Then an¬ 
other friend can demand a second and 40 minutes of debate can be taken up. 
He can do that over again, and with roll calls coming in he can exhaust a week 
instead of a day if he wants to. Then what will become of your motion to dis¬ 
charge committees? 

This prediction was fulfilled. After this juggling of calendars, the 
Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees was not reached a 
single time. Unless the Rules Committee shall voluntarily come to the 
rescue with a special rule there is now no way to compel a standing- 
committee to report business to the House. 

* * * He ♦ 

If the Committee on Rules were commissioned directly, by the 
American people, as a separate and complete congress, that sub¬ 
sidiary body would hardly have more power 
The Ruees Committee over legislation than it possessed and exer¬ 
cised during the last session. When acting, 
as it did, in harmony with the democratic caucus, the Rules Committee 


18 


could control any situation which might arise, not nominally, but 
actually and arbitrarily. Let us enumerate some of its special powers: 

A LAW UNTO ITSELF.— is no way in which the Rules Com¬ 
mittee can be forced to report to the House. It does not even come 
under the doubtful and inadequate jurisdiction of the juggled Calendar 
of Motions to Discharge Committees. All its acts, so far as the House 
is concerned, are voluntary. It would and did obey the secret, un¬ 
official, democratic caucus, but knew no other authority. 

On April 9, 1913, Lindbergh introduced House Resolution No. 848, 
requiring every congressman to file information concerning his prop¬ 
erty and business interests. This was aimed especially at the Com¬ 
mittee on Banking, commissioned to investigate the money trust with 
many of its members directly interested in banks, but was intended 
also to uncover the pecuniary interests of representatives on all other 
subjects of legislation. The point is that this resolution was referred 
to the Rules Committee and never acted upon; that there was and is 
absolutely no way in which the whole House can compel the Rules 
Committee to act upon any matter over which that body has juris¬ 
diction. 

AUTHORITY OVER INVESTIGATIONS. —Practically all reso¬ 
lutions for the appointment of committees to make special investigations 
are referred to the Rules Committee. A hint of what happened in the 
case of the Lindbergh attempt to bring about a real investigation of 
banking and currency conditions has already been given. The Rules 
Committee has the power to do exactly as it pleases in all such 
matters; that body can bury, delay, distort, or manipulate at will 
any investigative resolution; six of the ten members of the Rules 
Committee can smother the proposed investigation, make it a white¬ 
wash, or convert it into a mere instrument of partisan politics. 

SPECIAL RULES, handed down from the Rules Committee and 
caucussed through the House are of three kinds; (a) “gag” rules to 
complement the acts of the caucus; (b) those to meet the intentional 
deficiencies of the regular rules and permit certain legislation to come 
before the House; and (c) those which make buffers of certain bills 
to obstruct others which may have advanced in the routine way. A 
typical example of each kind should be considered here: 

(a) Gag Rules. —When the caucus had made “a party matter” of 
any measure, binding all democrats to support it “without amendment 
or motion to recommit” there still remained the danger that the 
minority members might propose amendments which it would em¬ 
barrass the majority to vote down. Politically considered, the only 
safe way was to prevent amendments. Accordingly the “gag” rule 
became one of the distinctive institutions of this session. It enabled 
a few reactionary leaders to control republican progressives on the 
floor of the House almost as effectively as democratic progressives 
were muffled and manacled in the caucus. As has already been 
pointed out, “gag rules” completed the power of the caucus not only 
to determine the fate of any proposal, but also the exact and only 
form in which it could be voted upon in the House. 

Many of these “gag rules” were engineered by the floor leader as 
chairman of the Ways and Means Committee; but the special rules 


19 


of this character not relating to tariff bills came through the Rules 
Committee. 

Different resolutions, involving different means of investigating 
charges of graft in connection with government shoe contracts were 
introduced by Difenderfer and Gardner. Both were referred to the 
Rules Committee. On February 6, 1912, this committee reported the 
Difenderfer resolution, with an amendment. The Gardner resolution 
still remained in the archives of that committee. 

When the Difenderfer resolution was brought before the House by 
the Rules Committee, Chairman Henry had the debate limited, at the 
expiration of which the previous question was ordered. 

“The previous question” shut off all amendments excepting the one 
proposed by the committee itself. It is true that the Henry motion 
fixing debate and thus precluding amendments was adopted by unan¬ 
imous consent, but that only illustrates the serfdom to which the 
House had been reduced. Most gag rules were fixed in that way, 
because the caucus was behind Henry and the democrats would have 
supported him at any time in a motion for the previous question. 
Minority members had learned this lesson through many experiences. 
In case the House had not silently approved the terms of debate im¬ 
posed, it might have been given no debate at all. 

I do not know which of these resolutions had the more merit. That 
does not matter. The lesson that the controversy teaches is more 
deeply fundamental. It illustrates the arbitrary power of the Rules 
Committee to circumvent and circumscribe the action of the whole 
House; it shows a typical “gag rule” in operation. 

Neither Gardner nor the whole House could have compelled the 
Rules Committee to report his resolution. More than that, and this 
is the immediate point, when the matter was before the House, 
Gardner was gagged against offering his proposal as an amendment. 
The previous question likewise gagged every other member; it shut 
off all amendments. A few were permitted the special privilege of 
talking, but at the end of the allotted time all had to vote for or 
against the Difenderfer resolution. 

A majority of six members of the Rules Committee had acted: that 
settled the question. Only an upheaval in the democratic caucus could 
have unsettled it. 

There might be illustration after illustration of the same sort of pro¬ 
cedure, but this one example will serve to explain the “gag” brand of 
special rules. The next kind to be considered is even more vicious: 

(b) New Legislation in Appropriation Bills .—On April 19, 1911, 
Mr. Henry, Chairman of the Rules Committee, arose and made this 
stereotyped announcement: 

“Mr Speaker, I offer the following privileged resolution, which I send to the 
desk.” 

The resolution was a long special rule, providing that certain new 
legislation might be incorporated in the Post Office Appropriations 
bill. And thereby hangs a tale. 


20 


With but few exceptions, all important measures acted upon at 
this session had each to be advanced through special rules, or else 
made alien parts of appropriation bills. In other words, the regular 
rules and methods in the House were such that it was impossible to 
secure legislation in the routine way. 

This special rule was provided chiefly because there was no regular 
way to get a parcels post bill before the House. The political ex¬ 
igencies of the situation demanded that that question be given con¬ 
sideration in some form. Accordingly, through a special dispensation 
of the Rules Committee, it was attached to an appropriation bill. 

Through no other manifestation is the new House system so clearly 
portrayed as in its attitude toward appropriation measures. It is 
difficult properly to emphasize and summarize this phase of the record 
in brief space, but I shall attempt to do so by presenting an outline 
of the situation which developed: 

1. It should be understood that the present method of making ap¬ 
propriations is the most unscientific, archaic, wasteful, and corrupting 
that could possibly be contrived. It is unscientific and archaic because 
there is neither official order nor responsibility in the origin of these 
'measures; wasteful because fully two-thirds of the time of congress 
has to be given to this sort of legislation; corrupting because politics, 
rather than necessity, dictates how and where appropriations shall be 
made—“the pork barrel” give and take idea being predominant. 

2. The present House seemed to welcome with open arms the time¬ 
taking feature. Instead of any systematic attempt to expedite and 
facilitate appropriations legislation, the reactionary leaders, apparently, 

.took full advantage of the regular and improvised opportunities to 
waste so much time in this direction that measures upon which they 
wished not to act could never be reached. 

3. Appropriation bills were made mere political footballs. After 
the gates had been opened wide through special rules permitting new 
legislation, these measures appropriating money were encumbered with 
alien amendments provided for the purpose of playing politics—em- 
barassing the President or the rival party. Examples of this were 
seen in the attempts to break down the civil service system and to 
abolish the Commerce Court in that way. It was great sport for the 
politicians and fitted perfectly into the general scheme of delay. 

The Underwood machine greatly overplayed this game. There were 
so many political manipulations with appropriations measures that in 
the end, the leaders lost control and the result was a sorry exhibition 
of trying to let go. The failure of Congress to adjourn seasonably 
is directly traceable to this situation. The session was prolonged at 
least two months because the bills appropriating money were not 
treated in a dignified manner upon their merits. 

The third kind of special rule that we have to consider rests upon 
still a lower plane of political manipulation. These may be character¬ 
ized as— 

(c) Buffers. —If, by chance or lack of foresight, a measure upon 
which it was dangerous to go on record should advance toward a 
final vote in a routine way, the Rules Committee, backed by the caucus, 



21 


could give precedence to other matters and thus prevent action on the 
first question. This procedure can best be explained through an 
illustration: 

On July 18, 1912, Mr. Henry offered a report from the Rules Com¬ 
mittee which advanced several bills. 

It _was openly charged on the floor of the House that this resolution, 
making^ privileged a number of measures, was for the purpose of 
preventing a vote on the immigration bill. Mr. Roddenbury, speaking 
on this point, said: 


Mr. Speaker, let no Member of the House misunderstand the significance of 
adopting this rule. A vote for this rule consigns to oblivion and to defeat for 
this session the bill restricting immigration, notwithstanding the fact it has been 
reported by a Democratic committee, and now on the calendar for two months.” 

From this incident we can illustrate other arbitrary powers of the 
Rules Committee: 

SPECIAL ORDERS. —In opposing the adoption of the special rule 
which gave the right of way over all excepting tariff and appropriation 
bills to the six measures named, Mr. Roddenbury contended that the 
immigration bill should have been included in the list. The House 
leaders did not dare to act upon so dangerous a question as immigra¬ 
tion at a session just before an election. Therefore Mr. Roddenbury 
pleaded in vain that that measure also be advanced. Instead, the 
Rules Committee not only did not make a special order of the im¬ 
migration bill, but placed so much privileged business ahead of it that 
adjournment came before the “buffers” could be removed. 

By making the immigration measure or any other bill a special 
order, that is making it privileged through a special rule, the Rules 
Committee could have brought it to a vote at almost any time. That 
body had the power to advance directly, or to retard indirectly, any 
measure which it chose for passage or slaughter. 

This brings us to still another phase of the work of this committee. 

STEERING COMMITTEE. —By the exercise of the powers just sug¬ 
gested the Rules Committee could assume the purely political function 
of “steering” the party in control into whatever situations the ex¬ 
igencies seemed to demand. The House, through this agency, could 
be steered toward or away from a vote on almost any issue. The 
Rules Committee, under this regime, could become a mere instrument 
of partisanship. 

jH * sK * 

The present Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives is 
composed of Robert L. Henry of Texas, chairman; Edward \V. Pou 
of North Carolina, Thomas W. Hardwick of Georgia, Augustus O. 
Stanley of Kentucky, Finis J. Garrett of Tennessee, Martin D. Foster 
of Illinois, and Matthew R. Denver of Ohio, democrats; and John 
Dalzell of Pennsylvania, William W. Wilson of Illinois, Irvine E. Len- 
root of Wisconsin, and Philip P. Campbell of Kansas, republicans. 

The suggestions concerning this committee are not made with any 
intention of reflecting either credit or discredit upon its members, in¬ 
dividually or as a body. If the situation could be made plain without 


22 


reference to members, I would prefer that way. My only purpose is to 
show the part the Rules committee plays in the new House system. 
Whether the committee employs its special privileges for or against 
the people is immaterial. 

Under Cannon the Rules committee was a sleeping giant. Under 
Underwood that body has become an active giant. 

Cannon did not need the help of the Rules committee after the rules 
were once made: Aldrich was forced to dominate the Senate without 
such assistance; but, excepting only the caucus, the Rules committee is 
the most necessary and essential feature of the new floor leader system 
in the House. 


J|e ♦ :(£ * 

It remains for us to consider but one other manifestation of the 
new House management—the gross abuse of Calendar Wednesday. 

Certain reforms in the law making methods were won 
Calendar by the progressives while Cannon was yet Speaker. 
Wednesday Probably the most vital of these was Calendar Wednes¬ 
day. This was the one day of each week which had to 
be given to the consideration of bills upon the calendar. 

The regular order of business contemplated that the House Calendar 
should be reached at least four days a week. Paragraph 4 of Rule 
XXIV, on this point, reads: 

After the unfinished business has been disposed of the Speaker shall call each 
standing committee in regular order, and then select committees, and each com¬ 
mittee when named may call up for consideration any bill reported by it on a 
previous day and on the House Calendar, and if the Speaker shall not complete 
the call of the committees before the House passes to other business, he shall 
resume the next call where he left off, giving preference to the last bill under con¬ 
sideration: Provided, That whenever any committee shall have occupied the morn¬ 
ing hour on two days, it shall not be in order to call up any other bill until the 
other committees have been called up in their turn. 


But under Cannon, and still more under Underwood, this rule was 
largely nullified by the accidental or intentional manipulation of priv¬ 
ileged matters in such a way that the “call of committees” was rarely 
reached. It “happened” that appropriation measures, sham battles on 
tariff questions, or other privileged questions were almost always in the 
way of regular bills. 

That was why the progressives had demanded and finally secured 
Calendar Wednesday—one day so guarded, it was thought, that 
nothing could interfere with the consideration and final passage of gen¬ 
eral legislation. The Calendar Wednesday rule is explicit and un¬ 
equivocal : 


Rule XXIV, Paragraph 7.—On Wednesday of each week no business shall be in 
order except as provided by paragraph 4 of this rule unless the House by a two- 
thirds vote on motion to dispense therewith shall otherwise determine. On such 
a motion there may be debate not to exceed five minutes for and against. On 
a call of committees under this rule bills rnay be called up from either the House 
or the Union Calendar, excepting bills which are privileged under the rules; but 
bills called up from the Union Calendar shall be considered in Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union. This rule shall not apply during the last 
two weeks of the session. It shall not be in order for the Speaker to entertain 
a motion for a recess on any Wednesday except during the last two weeks of 
the session. 


23 


Paragraph 4 of Rule XXIV displays its own purpose. It was in¬ 
tended that measures on the House calendar should have due and time¬ 
ly consideration. But that rule was practically annulled by the pre¬ 
ponderance of privileged matters, which came first and were never out 
of the way. To illustrate, the House might be facing final action on a 
bill regulating immigration—politically a dangerous queston. As a 
means of averting a vote in such an issue a number of diversions might 
occur: 

(1) The Rules committee, privileged to report at any time, might 
propose some special rule or bring other business before the House in 
the “buffer” form previously explained; 

(2) The Ways and Means committee, privileged to report at any 
time, might decide to occupy the front of the stage with a tariff bill. 
Perhaps, although the caucus had already acted on amendments and 
decreed the final form in which the bill should be voted upon, almost 
unlimited debate would be allowed and members permitted to offer 
amendment after amendment. All this depended largely upon the ex¬ 
tent of time to be killed; or 

(3) The Appropriations committee, privileged to report at any time, 
might call up an appropriation bill and thus prevent the consideration 
of some measure on the House Calendar. Appropriation matters were 
easily the chief offenders in this respect. The ramshackle, time-taking 
methods of making appropriations would undoubtedly be reformed and 
made scientific in a month, if they did not fit so well into the great 
game of obstruction and delay. 

Paragraph 7 of Rule XXIV, the reform which the progressives gained 
before Cannon was out of the Speakership, was in itself a confes¬ 
sion of the condition just described. And to remedy that condition 
this new action provided that on one day each week no business, re¬ 
gardless of its privileged character, should be allowed to interfere 
with the regular routine. 

Yet those in control of this Congress discovered how to obstruct 
business, even on sacred Calendar Wednesday. 

Bearing in mind that Calendar Wednesday, even if used honestly and 
industriously, would have been entirely inadequate to relieve the con¬ 
gestion of business, consider this record of the present House in the 
special and regular sessions: 

April 9, 1911, Calendar Wednesday was dispensed with by a two- 
thirds vote. 

April 26, dispensed with. 

-May 3, dispensed with. 

May 10, House was adjourned over Wednesday. 

May 17, given to other business. 

May 24, House adjourned over Wednesday. 

May 31, House adjourned over Wednesday. 

June 7, dispensed with. 

June 14, dispensed with. 

June 21, dispensed with. 

June 28, House adjourned over Wednesday. 

July 5. other business. 

July 12, dispensed with. 

July 19, dispensed with. 

July 26, House adjourned for a deceased member. 


24 


August 2, Underwood made a personal speech answering criticisms 
of the Commoner, and Mann moved to dispense with Calendar Wednes¬ 
day—“while the entertainment is going on.” 

August 9, Calendar Wednesday was used, mostly on bridge bills. 

August 16, same as above. 

So much for the special session. On only two out of eighteen Wednes¬ 
days was this calendar given consideration. There was not much 
business pressing in the early part of this session, but certainly no ex¬ 
cuse can be found for the neglect of Calendar Wednesday during the 
entire session. 

It was in the regular session, however, that the most flagrant and 
continued abuse of Calendar Wednesday took place. Of the three 
Wednesdays in December, the 6th, 13th and 20th, one was dispensed 
with and two given to ordinary matters. 

There were five Wednesdays in January. All but a part of one were 
given to bridge bills. Three of these were taken up with consideration 
of a single bill appropriating $15,000 as the government’s share in th*^ 
construction of a bridge across the Weymouth Back river. As Mr 
Berger pointed out. Congress, costing as it does about $30,000 a da^ 
spent $90,000 of time on a $15,000 matter, while many questions of na¬ 
tional importance had to wait. 

One Calendar Wednesday in February was dispensed with, the 21st 
Others from February 7 to March 6 were given to much debate and 
little real business. 

Then the Public Lands committee “had the call” until April 3. 

April presented no great difficulties to^ the obstructionists. The Com¬ 
mittees on Indian Affairs and Territories consumed all the Calendar 
Wednesdays. 

This continued through the first two Wednesdays of May. Then the 
real abuse of this calendar began. On the 15th a number of conferenc 
reports and miscellaneous matters were considered. On the 29th des¬ 
ultory debate was undertaken in earnest. As one example, Fitzgerald 
interposed a speech, quoting Lincoln and attacking Roosevelt. 

All through June there was open opposition to the use of every Cal¬ 
endar Wednesday. On the 5th occurred an unsuccessful attempt to 
dispense with that order. Again on the 12th a motion was made to 
dispense with Calendar Wednesday and carried. On the 19th Fitzger¬ 
ald moved to dispense, which was lost. The House adjourned over 
the 26th, which was the last Wednesday of the month. 

July capped the climax. There was no attempt to dispense with any 
Calendar Wednesday of this month. The tactics had changed. During 
the last four Wednesdays—the 10th, 17th, 24th. and 31st—the call rested 
with the committee on Labor, and the flood gates of oratory were 
thrown wide open. There was talk, talk, talk—upon the widest pos¬ 
sible range of subjects. If anyone wanted to make a speech, it seem¬ 
ingly was saved for some Calendar Wednesday, Politics predominated. 
Taft was eulogized and anthematized; Roosevelt was roasted and 
glorified: Wilson was treated in turn by friend and foe: the history of 
reinildicanism and the degeneracy of democracy were rehearsed again, 
and vice versa. On one occasion Barthold said, “I rise to tell the 
story of the Chicago contests,” which he did at great length. Then 
Howard explained. “I rise in my seat to defend the Georgia nigger.” 
and there followed an hour of wasted fun. They called Jt “general 


25 


debate.” Through all this tidal wave of talk the Calendar Wednesday 
call still “rested” with the Committee on Labor. 

That month was the crisis for the obstructionists. In August they 
experienced little difficulty. The 7th saw some of the best “ramble” 
debaters of the House occupying the center of the stage. Then came a 
real invasion into the supposedly impregnable Calendar Wednesday. On 
the 14th and again on the 21st the House took up tariff and appro¬ 
priation bills, holding them privileged above the regular order of that 
day. 

The inadequacy of Calendar Wednesday was multiplied five-fold by 
those in control of this Congress. 

♦ * ♦ ★ ♦ 

Compared with Cannonism, the new system is more complex, more 
irresponsible, far less business-like, and equally barren of beneficent 
results. In only one respect is it in any way superior to the Cannon 
regime. That consists in a certain freedom for members, which is 
more seeming than real. Jonathan Doe can get recognition now. He 
can make a speech, not a motion, without much restraint. So much 
has the new order yielded. Members do feel free—within certain 
carefully prescribed bounds. Their freedom is not permitted to have 
an influence on legislation. 

The progressives in this Congress are like the proverbial calf; al¬ 
though at liberty to enjoy a certain extent of rope, they find them¬ 
selves securely tethered to the post of caucus and special rules. They 
cannot get beyond a trivial zone of activity, and the more active they 
become within this zone the sooner are they tangled and helpless. 

♦ ♦ * * * 

Cannonism openly served reactionary interests; pretending otherwise, 
the succeeding House regime surreptitiously serves the same special 
and political interests. Under Cannon Jacob was himself in every en¬ 
terprise; today, in all essential things, “The voice is Jacob's voice, but 
the hands are the hands of Esau.” 

Advertising itself as democratic and deliberative, the present House 
of Representatives is ruled by an oligarchy in whose hands the major¬ 
ity is helpless. Oscar W. Underwood of the Ways and Means com¬ 
mittee, John J. Fitzgerald of the Appropriations committee and Robert 
L. Henry of the Rules committee, with a few others, are absolute 
masters of the popular branch of Congress. 

The secret, unofficial, unrepresentative, irresponsible caucus, and not 
the IJpuse, attends to the details of legislation; never in any previous 
legislative epoch did the caucus grow so great. 

Standing committees, acting in executive sessions with no public rec¬ 
ord of their acts, have been removed still farther from the authority 
and control of a majority of the House. 

Calendar Wednesday, a substantial reform secured in the Sixty-first 
Congress, has been distorted and abused. 

Partisanship, professionalism in politics, has been reenthroned in na¬ 
tional lawmaking. 

And the spectacle of duplicity has been extended into unnecessary 
months, because the inexperience and incompetence of those in control 
made it impossible for them to end the travesty orderly and in season. 


26 


Out of such environment, but little good legislation could come. The 
democratic leaders appeared to be seeking political rather than legis¬ 
lative results. In carrying out that program, the House legislated on 
many important issues with the expectation that its acts would be 
undone in the Senate or vetoed by the President. 

On the tariff, there were only sham battles, spectacular, perhaps, 
but always to no purpose. Bills were framed with the certain knowl¬ 
edge that they would be killed by the Senate or fail of the President’s 
signature. When the House had an opportunity to choose between 
two tariff reduction measures, they always selected the one surer of 
veto. 

Consider the wool bill as an example of this. First the House passed 
the Underwood bill, a democratic measure and one marked for veto. 
The Senate substituted a bill less drastic, but with substantial re¬ 
ductions in Schedule K. The Senate bill was much less liable to fall 
a victim to presidential displeasure, at the same time giving consider¬ 
able relief to the American people, yet the House democrats insisted 
on repassing the Underwood bill, one absolutely certain to be vetoed. 
After the second passage of the Underwood bill the Senate forced the 
House to accept a compromise, which was vetoed. 

The whole tariff program of the House seemed based upon that 
principle. It rested upon a campaign, rather than an economic basis. 
It was for political purposes, first and foremost. 

In the reference to Democrats in the Senate, which follows, there is 
evidence of collusion between the reactionaries of both parties. Proof 
is not wanting, in the case of the cotton bill, that standpat democrats 
and standpat republicans were working together to safeguard the super- 
protected interests and at the same time hoodwink the public into the 
belief that their rivalry was real, that a reduction of the tariff was the 
object of their efforts. 

It was much the same throughout the last session, and with every 
tariff measure. The President and his personal tariff commission laid 
down one standard of revision. The slightest deviation from that 
standard was sure of veto. Thus the democrats could, with perfect 
safety, orate and legislate on any level below the presidential dead line. 
Reactionary republicans could adhere strictly to the course prescribed 
by the alleged tariff commission, and get credit for being moderate 
tariff reformers. Meanwhile nothing could be accomplished, because 
the democrats would consent to no measure.which stood even a meagre 
chance of securing the President’s signature. 

The plain truth is that the South is now moving rapidly toward the 
high protectionist point of view on the tariff, especially on cotton and 
lumber; that so long as Southern democrats have the balance of power 
no adequate revision can be expected. Their unbroken attitude on 
Canadian reciprocity demonstrates the relative regard in which they 
hold the people and the special interests. 

It is a great game—revising the tariff—when everybody knows 
exactly what everybody else intends to do. 

The House passed labor legislation, only to have it buried in Senate 
committees, which fitted into the political program. The prophets fore¬ 
told that this would happen. To this and other fields that were prom¬ 
ising politically did the House devote its most vigorous vocal efforts. 


27 


The House democrats resorted to every trick known to sharp parlia¬ 
mentary practice to kill parcels post legislation. In the end they were 
forced by the Senate to pass the Bourne-Anderson bill. I wish there 
were space here to tell the story of that long drawn out fight. If the 
democrats had been able to adjourn congress seasonably they would 
have accomplished the defeat of any and all adequate legislation on the 
subject of parcels post. 

Measures that were politically “dangerous/' like the immigration 
bill, were not voted upon. 

The same thing can be said of bills which struck deeply at the great 
corporations, like the bill providing for the physical valuation of the 
property of the transportation trust. In the congestion of business 
that measure was not reached. 

Standing committees became cem.eteries for good bills, such as 
Senator Cummins’ measure providing that independent companies might 
have the right of appeal from circuit court decisions like the tobacco 
trust case. This Cummins bill remained buried in the House judiciary 
committee. 

To the very last loudly proclaiming economy, the democrats passed 
appropriation bills aggregating the usual billion dollars. More than 
that, appropriation measures were prostituted to political purposes. 

They attempted to break down the civil service principle through 
a provision that the service should change every seven years. This was 
a direct attempt to return to the spoils system. The vision of a demo¬ 
cratic administration doubtless inspired it. 


DEMOCRATS IN THE SENATE. 

(The foregoing condensed chapter from “Law Making in America” 
gives an accurate and fairly complete picture of democratic manage¬ 
ment of the House. To show also the part democrats, especially 
those from the South, are playing in the new Senate machine, there is 
reproduced here a brief extract from Chapter VI of “The Senate from 
1907 to 1912,” by Mr. Haines. This reveals an act of the combination 
of Southern Democrats and Eastern republicans in the special session 
of 1911:) 


THE COTTON BILE. 

It is rather difficult to write dispassionately the history of H. R. 
12812, the Underwood bill reducing the rates of the cotton schedule. 
There are few chapters in the entire annals of the Senate which reflect 
less of credit upon its members. The methods employed were the 
methods of petty politics. There was wholesale dodging, and duplicity. 

The situation can be shown in a sentence: the democrats were push¬ 
ing a bill which many of them wanted to see defeated; they made a 
deal with the reactionary republicans whereby the measure could be 
passed in such a form that it was absolutely certain to be vetoed by the 
President. 



28 


In compliance with an agreement between southern democrats and 
reactionary republicans, the latter refused to vote upon the amendments 
and final passage in the Senate of the' Underwood cotton bill, thus 
giving to the minority members the fullest opportunity to make the 
measure so drastic that its veto was inevitable. 

The Underwood bill passed the House, August 3rd, by a vote of 
202 to 90. It was reported adversely by the Senate Finance Committee 
on August 10th* Then the regular republicans ingloriously withdrew, 
leaving the minority of democrats in full control of the Senate. 

Bacon, who comes from a state with more than a hundred cotton 
mills, offered an amendment to this cotton bill, reducing also the rates 
of the metal schedule. This added a feature which made it easier for 
the President to veto the bill, and more certain, if additional assurance 
were necessary, that he would do so. Thirty-six republicans were 
absent or refrained from voting and the 28 affirmative democratic votes 
adopted the amendment. Twenty-five republicans, including the pro¬ 
gressives who were present, voted no. 

Overman, who represents North Carolina with nearly three hundred 
cotton mills, presented an amendment to the cotton bill revising the 
rates of the chemical schedule. This made the cotton bill still more 
confusing and more absolutely certain of veto. It was adopted, 27 to 
22, forty not voting. 

When the Underwood bill, with the Senate amendments making it 
more impossible, was placed upon its final passage, thirty-six did not 
vote and the measure was adopted 29 to 24. 

For once, thanks to the very extraordinary situation just described, 
a bill was passed in so satisfactory a form that it needed no “last-min¬ 
ute” amendments. Accordingly there was no conference committee. 
The democratic House agreed to the Senate changes in the cotton bill. 

President Taft vetoed the bill. 


THE DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATION 

By Gifford Pinchot. 

Can the Democrats be trusted to carry on the Conservation policy? 
This is a fair question, because the natural resources with which Con¬ 
servation deals are the raw materials of food, clothing, and shelter, and 
therefore Conservation touches directly and vitally the daily welfare 
of all our people through the cost of living. 

In the session of Congress just closed, the Conservation record of 
the Democratic House and its leaders was bad. An organized effort 
was made to break down the Conservation policy of protecting the 
public interest in water power. The proof of that statement is easy to 
supply. For example: The Hydro Electric Company of California had 
been trespassing on the Mono National Forest, under color of fraudu¬ 
lent mining locations, when it was stopped by injunction. The com¬ 
pany then agreed to apply for a government permit and on that 
promise was allowed to proceed with its work. Later it refused to 
accept the permit, which fixed a nominal charge of $75 a year for the 
use of the land which the company desired to occupy. Then followed 
(January 5, 1912) a unanimous favorable report from the Committee 
on Public Lands on the bill of Judge Raker of California to grant to 
the Company a right of way across this land. The Bill was about to 
pass the House when the friends of Conservation, after a bitter fight, 
succeeded in killing it. 

It is perfectly clear that the burden of this contest, which cost many 
thousands of dollars, was not undertaken by the Hydro Electric Com¬ 
pany merely to avoid a charge of $75 a year. The Raker Bill did not 
make possible any development which was impossible without it. Its 
single purpose was to establish a precedent of enormous value to the 
water power interests. Had the House succeeded in passing the Raker 
Bill it would have been notice to all water power companies that Con¬ 
gress was willing by special legislation to give the property of the 
people to the power companies unconditionally, forever, and for 
nothing. By just so much, monopoly would have been harder to con¬ 
trol, and the right of the people to handle their own water power 
property in their own interest would have been impaired or destroyed. 

While this was going on the Democratic House had reduced the ap¬ 
propriation of the Forest Service by more than one million dollars. 
This money was needed to protect the forests, hire men to fight forest 
fires, and build telephone lines, bridges, roads, and trails needed to 
bring them quickly to the line of fire. The reduction was made in the 
face of the record of 1910, when seventy-nine fire fighters and twenty- 
five settlers were burned to death in the National Forests, and twelve 
million dollars’ worth of timber was destroyed, and with full knowl¬ 
edge that the National Forests, which contain about two billion dollars 
worth of public property, are in grave danger of even greater losses. 
When the country learned the facts, public indignation was aroused 


30 


over the needless risk of lives and property entailed by this ind^- 
ference to the public welfare, and a small fraction of the money the 
House cut off was finally restored. This harm was done under 
the guise of the much advertised effort to save millions of dollars to 
the taxpayers. Yet in the end no economy appeared, for this is a bil¬ 
lion dollar session, like the last. 

But that was not all. The reduced appropriation was not passed 
until nearly two months after it was due, so that the appropriations of 
the previous year had twice to be extended a month at a time, and the 
uncertainty and delay became as costly and injurious as the actual re¬ 
duction in funds. 

This was incompetence, and nothing else. It is of a piece with the 
effort of the Democrats to restore the spoils system in the Civil 
Service by declaring all places vacant once in seven years, and the 
specific orders given to the President by Congress that he must not 
improve the present confused and unbusinesslike method of submitting 
estimates of the money needed to run the government. 

On July 29, 1912, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com¬ 
merce unanimously reported the so-called Omnibus Dam Bill. Al¬ 
though this Bill proposed to grant rights to water powers on navigable 
streams worth not less than forty million dollars, no open hearings 
were held upon the ten projects and sixteen dams which it authorized. 
The Bill placed public assets of enormous and rapidly increasing com¬ 
mercial value in the hands of great corporate interests without re¬ 
quiring compensation to the public for value received, and without 
reserving to the Government the right to control the price to the con¬ 
suming public. Yet the men to whom this Bill proposed to give these 
privileges could well afford to pay for what they got, for with one 
possible exception, every company concerned was related to the great 
monopolistic water power combinations in New York. 

In a report of the Commissioner of Corporations issued last March 
ten water power corporations are proved to control about 60 per cent 
of all the ‘developed commercial water power in the United States, and 
about 1,500,000 horse powder undeveloped. Twenty-four hydro electric 
corporations, over fifty public service corporations, and over fifty 
financial houses or banks, besides railroads and factories, are con¬ 
trolled by twenty officers and directors of the General Electric Com¬ 
pany and its three subsidiaries. 

Yet in the face of such facts as these every effort was made by the 
Democratic leaders to push the Omnibus Dam Bill through. Amend¬ 
ments which would have cured the evils and retained the good were 
proposed by Conservationists but not adopted. Finally publicity killed 
the bill. 

The Coosa River case was still more flagrant. Here the whole power 
of the Democratic majority in Congress was employed to give away to 
a foreign corporation water power rights on the Coosa River in Ala¬ 
bama which belong to all the people of the United States. 

The entire capital stock and bonds of the Alabama Power Com¬ 
pany, to which the gift was made so far as Congress could make it 
are owned or controlled by a Canadian corporation which also controls 
the Birmingham-Montgomery Power Company and the Muscle Shoals 
Hydro-Electric Company. These two companies have a charter 


granted in 1900 by the State of Alabama, which is unlimited in time, 
exacts no payment of compensation to the people, and is not for¬ 
feitable for failure to develop. Under it they have the right to build 
,dams and reservoirs, to distribute electricity to cities, to acquire by 
purchase or otherwise stocks, bonds, or other securities, and to exer¬ 
cise all powers belonging to manufacturing companies. Furthermore, 
ciiey are given the right of eminent domain, and their property is 
exempted from taxation for ten years. There is no limjt on specula¬ 
tion, and no power the State can give is withheld. 

This is the way the doctrine of States Rights, just now the main 
dependence of all resource-grabbing corporations, protects the people of 

case that doctrine was invoked by the 
Democratic leafkirS^f^he House to give the property of the people of 
the United States not to a corporation of Americans, but to a Canadian 
corporation owned abroad, which already controls 400,000 horse power 
in Alabama. Canada is well supplied with water power. The Canadians 
come here because under bills like this they hope to get privileges 
which their own Government wisely refuses to give them. 

The Coosa River Bill was vigorously opposed by Progressives like 
Kent of California, and not all the House Dernocrats yielded to the 
pressure from Underwood and the other leaders which put this bill 
through. Although the Democratic chairmen of twenty-three of the 
great committees of the House voted for this bill, men like Rainey, 
Foster, Humphreys, and Sherley, to their honor be it spoken, stood 
strongly against the bulk of their Party, but they were too few. With 
the hearty support of Mr. Cannon, the bill passed, but in the end the 
President wisely vetoed it. 

This is a partial list of the things done or attempted against the con¬ 
servation policy at the last session of this Democratic Congress. If 
some sound constructive conservation laws had been passed to offset 
this record the conclusion might be different. But the House took no 
action to protect and develop the resources of Alaska, in spite of the 
known need and the strong public demand for such legislation. It did 
nothing to develop a policy for our inland waterways or begin the 
permanent control of floods in the Mississippi, although the most 
effective of all object lessons, the last great flood itself, took place 
during the session. It touched the water power policy only to injure 
it, and it failed to provide for reducing the cost of living by protecting 
and increasing the meat producing power of the western public lands, 
as it was urged to do. 

On such a record there is but one answer to the question with which 
this article began. It is not safe to trust the Democrats with the Con¬ 
servation interests of this Nation. 



congress 1912 






